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Abstract 
In a parliamentary system it is by definition justified to assume the government 
parties voting almost always in a unitary manner in plenary votes. In a multiparty 
system it is, however, hard to predict how the opposition groups vote. Few studies 
analysing government-opposition voting in the Finnish parliament Eduskunta were 
published during the 1960s and 1970s. This study provides similar analyses 
regarding the parliamentary years of 1991-2012. Combined the studies provide an 
insight into the government-opposition relations since World War II. The results 
show that before the 1990s the government-opposition division in plenary votes 
appeared rather clear and the political party groups’ positions followed the 
traditional left-right dimension. Since the 1990s, the government-opposition division 
has become greater. The governing coalition acts almost as a bloc while the 
opposition groups are divided into moderate and hard opposition. The opposition 
groups, however, appear in a more or less random order. Consequently, since the 
1990s the left-right dimension has disappeared with respect to plenary voting. 
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Introduction 
In parliamentary systems it is rather obvious to assume that the government 
groups almost always vote together in plenary votes. In such multi-party systems it 
is much harder to predict how the opposition groups vote. For example, some 
groups might act as support parties for government coalitions while some groups 
might nearly always oppose the coalition for tactical or political reasons. This study 
analyses opposition and government groups’ plenary voting behaviour in the 
Finnish parliament ‘Eduskunta’. In the analyses below the data cover the 
parliamentary years of 1991-2012. Together with previous Finnish plenary voting 
studies published earlier in the late 1960s and early 1970s we are able to provide 
an insight into cooperation between government and opposition in Eduskunta since 
World War II. 
The context of parliamentary politics in Finland has changed considerably over 
time. Nousiainen (2000, 2006) divides Finnish parliamentary history into three 
distinctive eras. The first of them lasted from the beginning of the country’s 
independence in 1917 to the late 1930s. Representative of the time were short 
lived bourgeois minority coalitions. After the exceptional years of the war, 
distinctive to the second parliamentary era were majority coalitions which were 
formed around the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Finnish Agrarian Union 
(ML, later renamed as the Centre party KESK). Later in the 1960s and onwards the 
Communist Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL) also participated from 
time to time in government. These majority coalitions were still short lived. The 
party groups were somewhat inflexible with their governmental policies and 
negotiating a solution during governmental crisis was impossible more often than 
not. The second parliamentary era continued to the early 1980s. The prolonging of 
this era was caused by “issues of foreign policy”, i.e. relations with the Soviet 
Union (Nousiainen 2006, 294). Consequently, the National Coalition (KOK), a 
bourgeois party, was not considered as a plausible coalition partner even though it 
had grown in popularity over the decades. The third parliamentary era can be seen 
to have started after Sorsa’s fourth cabinet (1983-1986). Governments lasting for 
the whole electoral period have been the standard almost without exceptions since 
then. What is distinctive to the third parliamentary era was also the dismissal of the 
old triangle of SDP, SKDL and KESK as the backbone of the coalitions. The 
following the Holkeri government (1987-1990) had SDP and KOK as the main 
coalition parties. After the Holkeri government basically any majority coalition could 
have and has been possible as ideological issues have not been an obstacle. A 
new triangular phenomenon took place during 1991-2010: out of the three largest 
parties (KESK, KOK, SDP) two were the main coalition partners and one was left in 
opposition. The 2011 elections resulted in a sudden success for the populist True 
Finns (PS) and the party became the third largest party in Eduskunta. Previous 
studies together with the applied data and analyses below will provide a rough 
picture of two parliamentary eras since World War II. 
In the previous context plenary votes are at the core of political decision-making, 
however, the mass media are not interested in the votes unless there are notable 
dissidents within party groups or there are dissident government groups, for 
example. What the mass media is publishing very frequently is discussion which 
highlights the division between government and opposition. A weakly justified belief 
might well be that the opposition always votes against the government for political 
and tactical reasons. The previous Finnish studies, however, provide evidence that 
this is not the case in Eduskunta. Also the analyses below lend support to this 
observation. Moreover, I show that the government-opposition relations have 
changed considerably between the last two parliamentary eras. 
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While Eduskunta has its own peculiarities and nuances, it can still be regarded as 
a rather typical mainstream parliamentary legislature. The main research setting, 
which is elaborated later on, is the following: first, most probably the government 
groups act in a unitary manner in plenary votes while the opposition groups do not. 
There is no systematically coordinated opposition. Moreover, it is often the case 
that the opposition is comprised of parties in opposite ends of the traditional left-
right dimension. Second, the opposition groups vote with the government in 
varying degrees while an extreme opposition always opposing the government is 
not likely to exist. This setting leads to the main research questions: How united is 
the government? How united is the opposition? Into what extent do the opposition 
groups vote with the government? What can we say about cooperation among the 
party groups during the last two parliamentary eras? The remaining step in the 
analysis is the theoretical question of what explains the party groups’ observed 
behaviour. The theoretical framework presented in Arter (2006, 180-2) suggests 
parties exercising various strategies in parliamentary activities. The office-seeking, 
policy-seeking and profile-seeking (vote-seeking) strategies refer to opposition, 
although they can be used with respect to the governing parties as well. While the 
strategies are not mutually exclusive, they can be used as an aid in explaining the 
voting behaviour of the party groups. 
This work draws heavily on Pajala (2011) published in Finnish. The data regarding 
the modern years in Pajala (2011) were limited to 1991-2006. The applied data 
below include six additional parliamentary years and now cover the 2007-2010 
electoral term as well as the first two years of the 2011-2014 term. Here I also 
apply a variation of the cooperativeness illustration method by Laakso (1972a) 
instead of the original version used in Pajala (2011). 
Following the introduction is a review of the previous Finnish studies and their main 
results concerning the second parliamentary era. Subsequent to this I introduce the 
theoretical framework together with an account on Finnish parliamentary opposition 
and its changing role in Eduskunta. The next chapter starts by presenting the data, 
which are followed by the yearly analyses of government-opposition voting. Next, a 
variation of the cooperation measure developed by Laakso (1972a) is introduced 
and the votes are pooled and analysed per electoral terms. In order to get a 
comprehensive picture between the two parliamentary eras, I compare the results 
with the earlier findings of Laakso and others. A short discussion concludes. 
Previous and Related Research 
The political dimensions constructed below are explicitly interpreted as the 
government–opposition dimensions. As such they cannot be treated as 
“ideological” dimensions, but rather as “practical” dimensions apparent in 
parliamentary systems. Recently Pajala (2012) analysed plenary votes in 
Eduskunta using the Optimal Scaling (OC) method developed by Poole (2000; 
2005). OC and other scaling methods are able to provide the ideal points of the 
MPs in a number of political dimensions. As in latent variable analysis, the political 
dimensions have to be interpreted by the researcher. One of Pajala’s (2012) main 
results is that during the last few decades the dimension having the most 
explanatory power is the government–opposition dimension. Higher, possibly 
ideological, dimensions had only very marginal explanatory power and could not be 
sensibly interpreted. Put another way plenary votes seem to reflect ideological 
dimensions rather poorly. Ideological dimensions colour the background while 
plenary voting is everyday politics. 
Setting aside plenary votes, political dimensions and parties’ ideal points have 
been studied by other means as well. Use of expert interviews by Benoit and Laver 
(2006) is one such possibility while the textual analysis of party programmes by 
Klingemann et al. (2006) is another. These data have also been gathered 
regarding Finland, however there is slight variation in the positioning of some of the 
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parties between the expert interviews and textual analyses. Recently Paloheimo 
(2008, 54), using multidimensional scaling in conjunction with opinion poll data, 
concluded that the traditional left-right dimension is still the most important 
ideological dimension in Finland. 
While plenary votes no longer highlight the left-right dimension, this was not the 
case in the past. Regarding previous decades some pioneering plenary vote 
analyses were carried out by Risto Sänkiaho (1969), Markku Laakso (1972a; 
1972b) and Pekka Nyholm (1969; 1972). This promising array of analyses seems, 
however, not to have continued afterwards. The data regarding the above studies 
concern the 1950s and 1960s and provide us with a rather good view on the 
second parliamentary era of Finland. As below, the historical analyses were carried 
out in the PPG level. However, instead of having the government majority fixed to 
the extreme-right the studies had the National Coalition fixed to the right (in a 
technical sense). 
The methods applied in the Laakso, Sänkiaho and Nyholm studies varied, although 
the basic idea in all of them was to measure and evaluate PPG cooperation and 
distances by comparing group majorities vis-à-vis each other in plenary votes. 
Sänkiaho also compared individual Members of Parliament (MPs) somewhat along 
the lines of modern scaling methods. The results in the studies are rather similar 
regardless of the method used. The cooperation or distance measure introduced 
by Laakso (1972a) together with a variation of his graphical presentation method is 
applied below. Pekka Nyholm (1972) relied on older technique and used a slightly 
simpler cooperation measure proposed by Stuart Rice (1928). 
Although the research of Sänkiaho (1969) is limited in data, it is methodologically 
the richest. He starts his account by finding out how the individual voting decisions 
of the MPs correlate over the votes. In order to find out factors affecting the voting 
decisions of the MPs the correlation matrix is then used for factor analysis. The 
most important factor thus obtained was the party affiliation of the MPs. Laakso, 
Sänkiaho and Nyholm studied various pre-defined PPG combinations over the 
votes as well. Deviating from other papers Sänkiaho reports an interesting detail 
according to which the MPs voted but few times against their respective PPG 
majority. This result complements the earlier voting cohesion analysis of Nyholm 
(1961) by showing that deviations from complete PPG voting unity are not a result 
of the same rebellious MPs. 
Two common denominators in the historical studies are: (1) plenary votes highlight 
the difference between government and opposition PPGs. As said above, this is a 
feature parliamentary systems, however compared with the results below, the 
distance between government and opposition now appear to be greater (2) plenary 
votes highlighted the PPGs appearing according to the traditional left-right 
dimension as well. Here, however, the second and third parliamentary eras differ in 
one important aspect. Previously, the main coalition partners were always adjacent 
groups in the left-right dimension. In more recent times (since the Holkeri 
government 1987-1990), this has only once been the case. If the cabinet is not 
connected, this affects the plenary voting of the opposition as well. 
Below we shall treat the PPGs as having just one voice. This assumption is 
realistic and justified as already the historical studies showed that the most 
important factor behind the voting decisions of the MPs was found to be the party 
affiliation. Indeed, intra-party voting cohesion in Finland has been very high 
throughout the two latest parliamentary eras. Over the decades, the voting 
cohesion has increased even further (Nyholm and Hagfors 1968; Pajala and 
Jakulin 2007). Among the Nordic countries voting cohesion in Finland has been the 
lowest (Jensen 2000). During the 2007-2010 electoral term, some of the PPGs had 
perfect voting unity, so the difference nowadays is likely to be hairbreadth. 
Internationally, PPGs in parliamentary systems typically have very high internal 
voting cohesion. The Rice cohesion index ranges from zero to one, and typically 
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the respective values are well over 0.9 (Rice 1928, Sieberer 2006). Systems 
showing low PPG voting cohesion are usually non-parliamentary. The usual 
examples are the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress, for which the 
cohesion values are around 0.6-0.7. 
Opposition in Eduskunta 
Finally, as the assumption of PPGs in the governing coalition voting similarly is at 
the very heart of parliamentary systems the main interest lies in the behaviour of 
the opposition. It seems there is rather little systematic research on parliamentary 
oppositions (for references see Pajala 2011, 216). Mainly, the literature focuses in 
defining and studying the nature of opposition and distinguishing different types of 
opposition in various countries. Regarding Finland the chapters in Arter (2006) and 
the monograph by Rantala (1982) are probably the most recent and 
comprehensive accounts. The standard Finnish textbooks review the opposition 
only very briefly (Nousiainen 1998; Paloheimo and Wiberg 1996; Wiberg 2008). 
The book series published in the honour of the 100-year-old Eduskunta include 
some articles (Jyränki 2006; Nousiainen 2006; Ollila 2007). 
Parliamentary opposition in Finland is defined here to consist of those PPGs and 
MPs who are not in the government coalition. The most important tasks of the 
opposition usually found in the literature are listed for example by Helms (2008): 
(1) criticising the government, (2) scrutinising and checking governmental actions 
and policies, and (3) representing a credible ‘alternative government’. Two kinds of 
opposition are identified by Sartori (1971), which are relevant here: First there is 
the responsible constitutional opposition, which includes PPGs who are aware of a 
realistic possibility of being in the government in the future. The behaviour of these 
parties is usually rather modest and realistic in parliaments and in parliamentary 
elections. The second type is a constitutional but non-responsible opposition. 
Parties belonging to this category are aware that their probability to govern is very 
low. These irresponsible opposition parties tend to be “promising wildly and 
outbidding” as Sartori (1971, 35) puts it. In the newest i.e. the third Finnish 
parliamentary era the opposition parties can all be categorised being responsible 
opposition parties. Basically any of the PPGs could have been in government 
responsibility. In the preceding second era, at least two right-wing parties (including 
the National Coalition KOK) were in permanent opposition for some decades, 
however these parties still acted more or less as responsible oppositions. During 
this era, the strong left-right dimension limited the number of possible government 
coalitions, however the gradual disintegration of the dimension opened up new 
avenues. According to Nousiainen (2000; 2006, 297) after the 1999 parliamentary 
elections any majority coalition could have been possible. Ideological restrictions 
were not obstacles any more. In fact, probably the same would hold for at least two 
previous elections as well. As Finland is not a two-party system the opposition 
cannot represent a credible alternative government, but its main task remains to 
criticise the government and to some extent scrutinise and check governmental 
actions and policies. Deviating from Finland the Scandinavian neighbours have a 
long tradition of minority governments, which often need support from opposition 
parties in order to pass legislation. Hence, the supporting parties might be in 
“opposition” in varying degrees (Christensen and Damgaard 2008). Summing up 
the previous, opposition PPGs in Eduskunta will present policy alternatives and 
hence will distinguish itself from the governing coalition. 
Nousiainen (2006) characterises the current role and choice space of the 
opposition: as the Finnish parliamentary system is currently a true majority one the 
opposition groups can be regarded as powerless spectators while the 
governmental parties negotiate and decide upon major political issues. The most 
important political decision making and negotiation arena is the cabinet 
negotiations and especially the writing of the government programme. This process 
lasts few weeks after the elections, however, the most important policy formulation 
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takes place during this short period of time. The most visible arena the opposition 
is left with is the plenary hall (Ollila 2007). During plenary sessions, the opposition 
has the opportunity to criticise the actions and policies of the government and 
provide their own alternatives to government bills by votes. Also parliamentary 
interpellations as well as government reports and announcements (which can 
include the votes of confidence regarding a single minister or the whole cabinet) 
are handled in plenary sessions. 
The role of the opposition has not always been as limited. During the second 
parliamentary era, the postponement rule and especially two-thirds qualified 
majority requirement guaranteed the opposition, if united, the possibility to delay an 
ordinary law proposal to the next annual parliamentary session when it had to be 
adopted unchanged in order to become a law. Should this happen it would have 
been a defeat for the government. Sometimes only the threat to use the 
postponement possibility guaranteed the united opposition (minimum of 67 MPs) 
negotiation leverage. The current “true” majority system has been seen being 
established along with the 1992 partial constitutional reform when the 
postponement rule and the qualified majority requirement regarding ordinary 
legislation were removed from the old 1906 Constitution and the 1928 
Parliamentary Act. Previous partial reforms in the 1980s to the 1928 Parliamentary 
Act had changed the postponement of a law proposal only to the next annual 
parliamentary session instead of postponing it to the next electoral term (Helander 
1990; Jyränki 2006, 102-105). The old regulations can be seen as being rather 
efficient as laws were very rarely postponed. According to Helander (1990, 57) on 
average only 1.5 law proposals were postponed yearly during 1917-1986. 
Modern Finnish society in general does not resemble much of what it was during 
the 1950s, 1960s or even the 1970s. In the past, the class cleavages were 
substantially wider. Since World War II Finland gradually became a very wealthy 
country and at the same time the class cleavages became much thinner. The vast 
majority of the Finnish population can be seen belonging to the upper or lower 
middle class. At the same time also political parties have changed and their 
political programmes have significantly converged (Paloheimo and Raunio 2008; 
Paloheimo 2008). Parties have adopted catch-all strategies which aim at 
maximising votes in general elections. Paloheimo and Raunio (2008) call modern 
parties “election parties” (vaalipuolue). This progress continued more or less 
undisturbed for decades. Only after the 2011 elections the party system 
experienced a major shock. The True Finns (PS), a radical populist protest party, 
won the elections and suddenly became the third largest party in Eduskunta. 
Compared with the second parliamentary era the governing coalition can 
nowadays be regarded as a true bloc. Instead of the short lived cabinets of the 
second era, which Nousiainen (2000; 2006, 294) characterises as politically fast 
pulsing, overall rather unorganised and only weakly predictable, the governments 
have remained in power for the whole electoral periods since 1983. Now the 
government programmes are long and detailed thus requiring a strong commitment 
of the coalition partners. In the 1970s, the government programmes were few 
pages in length while the current programme of the Katainen government contains 
over 100 pages and is the result of intense negotiations after the 2011 elections. 
The coalition partners also sign a set of written rules guiding their behaviour in the 
parliament. Hence, inside the coalition the PPGs or MPs are not allowed much 
room to move and the bloc acts almost in a unitary manner. 
The opposition, in turn, is not systematically coordinated. Its position in the 
parliament is hard and the main public working arena is the plenary hall. The role 
of the opposition is narrowed to criticise the actions of the government in speeches 
and providing alternatives to government bills (creating votes). Chances having an 
effect on major political decisions or strategies are virtually non-existent. In order to 
predict how the opposition parties vote we shall turn into the basic framework of 
PPG strategies in parliamentary systems. Accordingly, PPGs can adopt three main 
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strategies: first, an office-seeking strategy, second, a policy-seeking strategy, and 
finally, a profile-seeking (vote-seeking) strategy. The strategies are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather complimentary. (Arter 2006, 181-182.) These strategies lead 
us to the following rank order prediction of opposition PPGs. 
The largest PPGs (KESK, KOK, SDP and PS since 2011), when in opposition, will 
adopt mainly an office-seeking strategy. These parties will remain in moderate 
opposition as they do not risk the chance of being considered too far from the 
mainstream policy consensus. In opposition they will not irritate the governing 
coalition too much as this might have negative consequences in future government 
formation. 
Other, smaller PPGs, while also interested in stepping into office, have lower 
chances of succeeding. These parties have a stronger need to appeal to their 
voters and thus need to exhibit more profile-seeking strategies when in opposition. 
Therefore the distances of the smaller PPGs from the government majority are 
likely to be greater than the above large parties. 
The hardest (but not necessarily extreme) opposition is likely to consist of (small) 
radical parties (Arter, 2006, 182). In Finland these would include the radical 
populist PS and possibly VAS, which is the leftmost PPG regarding the left-right 
dimension. These parties probably exhibit the most active policy-seeking strategy. 
Finally, in the following section the voting patterns are studied per parliamentary 
year as well. When elections approach in the last year of an electoral term, parties 
need to stand out. With respect to plenary voting opposition parties can act in two 
ways: vote more frequently with the government or against it. The former would 
indicate a party getting closer to the mainstream political consensus presenting 
itself as a viable coalition partner. The latter would indicate a party presenting itself 
as a true alternative to the governing coalition. Both strategies would be carried out 
in order to attract voters. However, as plenary votes are mostly a product of 
opposition activity and opposition parties support their own initiatives, intuitively it 
should be the case that opposition parties move apart from the government during 
the last year of an electoral period. 
Data and Analyses 
The applied data is collected by Pajala and Jakulin (2012) and include detailed 
information about all 12269 plenary votes taken during 1991-2010 parliamentary 
years. Pajala (2013) has gathered 1077 votes for the 2011 and 2012 parliamentary 
years. Roughly half of the votes are budget amendment votes. These votes take 
place in December when Eduskunta decides upon the state budget for the next 
fiscal year. For more details on the votes see Pajala (2006). As I shall consider 
aggregate level votes instead of individual MP vote decisions, two definitions are 
needed for the analyses below: first, the voting choice of a PPG is the one 
supported by the majority of the PPGs members. Consequently, if the majority of 
the members of a PPG voted “yes” then the voting choice of the whole PPG is also 
“yes”. Otherwise the PPGs voting choice is “no”. I shall not consider abstentions or 
absent MPs. Second and likewise, the voting choice of the government is the one 
supported by the majority of the government coalition MPs. One person groups 
have been disregarded. For example, the True Finns exist only since 2003 even 
though the party had one MP (Raimo Vistbacka) during 1995-2002. 
Government-Opposition voting per parliamentary year 
Comparing PPG majorities with government majorities over plenary votes in a 
parliamentary year let us see in relative terms how often a PPG cooperates with 
the government. Table 1 shows the results in columns 3-12. The second column 
indicates the number of plenary votes in the parliamentary year and the third 
column shows the share of votes where the government groups were not in 
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complete unison. As can be seen the government groups have nearly always (in 
well over 90 percent of the votes) been in complete unison. On average only some 
5 percent of the votes are such that one or more government groups voted against 
the government majority. Since 2007 the disunity of the government has been less 
than 1 percent and during the past two parliamentary years the cabinet has been in 
complete unison. In this sense the last six years in Table 1 deviate from preceding 
times. During 1994 and 2002 cabinet disunity is exceptionally high: regarding the 
former year the Christian Democrats (KD) resigned from the cabinet, as did the 
Green League (VIHR) regarding the latter year 2002. Also in 1996 the government 
disunity is rather high as in 12.4 percent of the votes the government coalition was 
not in complete unison. While no obvious reason for this phenomenon is apparent 
the disunity can be seen throughout the Lipponen II government (1999-2002) 
coalition, however the SDP seems to toe the government line better than others. 
The same applies to 2002a, however this time it is an election year. In the other 
columns of Table 1 we can see the cooperation scores. The bold and underline 
style government groups deviate clearly from the opposition groups as their 
cooperation scores are always very close to the maximum value 100. Once again 
the change in 2007 and onwards is clear as the maximum value appears more 
often than not in the cabinet PPG cells. Resignation from the cabinet substantially 
lowers the cooperation scores as can be seen in the cases of KD and VIHR in rows 
1994b and 2002b, respectively. 
At least as interesting are the opposition PPGs cooperation scores. An extreme 
opposition group, which would have cooperation score zero does not exist in Table 
1, however, after the 2011 parliamentary elections the True Finns (PS) were nearly 
there in 2011 when their score was only 2.0 out of 100. Indeed, the hardest 
opposition politics has been exercised by the PS, especially after the 2007 
elections. Also Left-wing Alliance VAS (when in opposition) has shown similar 
behaviour, most visibly during the 2007-2010 term. The agreement score of the KD 
has been on the rise throughout their opposition period and was already over 50 in 
2010. However, the most moderate group has been KOK during 2003-2006. Well 
over 50 percent of the votes were such that the majority of KOK MPs voted in line 
with the government. For other times the same holds for the Young Finns 
(NUORS) and to some extent also VIHR. Whenever one of the largest groups 
(SDP, KESK or KOK) was in opposition, the PPG exercised rather modest voting 
behaviour against the government, especially in the later years. A notable 
exception is PS during the last parliamentary term: PS is now the third largest 
group; however it is almost an extreme opposition party. Only the Swedish 
People’s Party (SFP) has been continuously in the cabinet. An interesting detail is 
a cycle where opposition parties tend to get closer to government during the last 
year of an electoral term. This observation is against the prediction stated above. 
Nyholm (1961, 124-125) defines two aspects with respect to matters processed in 
Eduskunta. First, there are matters for which the technical contents are very 
important. Second, there are matters for which the political significance is high. 
Nyholm (1961, 124) continues to propose a dimension where one extreme would 
denote matters of pure technical interest. In the middle are matters with rather 
balanced political and technical importance. In the other extreme are matters of 
utmost political importance. These are votes of confidence such as parliamentary 
interpellations, government reports and announcements. Nyholm (1961) observed 
that PPGs voting unity is higher in the votes of confidence as did Pajala (2010, 14-
15) regarding the current data. Keeping in mind the results in Table 1 the PPGs 
seem to approach the vast majority of the votes considering the technical contents 
of the proposals. It would seem that the political importance of the votes is not very 
high as otherwise the scores in Table 1 would be lower than they appear. 
Following the idea of Nyholm (1961) Pajala (2011) separated and analysed the 
votes of confidence. The hypothesis was that compared with the results in Table 1 
the government groups should now show higher agreement scores and the 
opposition groups lower. While the prediction for the former was correct the latter 
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groups did not show lower scores, but in some cases even higher. The PPGs 
internal voting unity is higher regarding votes of confidence, however the 
opposition groups do not vote more often against the government in these votes as 
one might have assumed. 
Table 1. Government Groups’ voting unity and shares (%) of plenary votes during 
1991-2012, where other PPGs voted with the government majority 
Year Vot. Gov. SDP 
KES
K 
KO
K 
VIH
R SFP KD VAS PS VR VAR 
NU
OR
S 
SM
P 
1991 621 2,6 51,2 99,8 100,0 40,6 98,9 98,4 13,2     34,1 
1992 834 4,9 26,5 99,6 99,4 26,1 98,3 97,2 17,4     24,1 
1993 897 6,5 28,8 98,6 99,0 25,4 97,1 97,8 16,6     17,2 
1994a 179 12,8 22,9 96,1 98,3 25,1 95,5 92,2 19,0     32,4 
1994b 795 5,0 46,2 97,5 98,6 32,1 98,9 55,0 21,6     28,3 
1995 273 1,8 100,0 19,4 
100,
0 98,5 
100,
0 16,5 99,6   27,1 52,0  
1996 315 12,4 98,1 24,8 95,6 95,2 93,0 26,3 97,5   48,9 53,3  
1997 279 6,1 97,1 28,3 99,3 96,8 99,3 25,1 97,1   54,8 50,9  
1998 372 7,5 98,7 34,7 98,9 95,2 97,8 26,3 96,8   58,1 62,4  
1999 249 4,0 98,4 45,8 99,2 98,4 98,8 31,3 98,0      
2000 253 5,9 98,0 34,0 98,8 95,7 98,4 20,9 96,0      
2001 271 5,9 99,3 36,9 99,3 97,8 99,3 30,6 97,4      
2002a 25 16,0 100,0 24,0 96,0 84,0 92,0 24,0 96,0      
2002b 456 3,7 98,7 48,7 99,3 61,4 98,9 37,7 97,6      
2003 491 2,9 98,8 100,0 68,2 51,9 98,4 45,6 25,7 15,7     
2004 723 4,3 97,9 99,7 66,0 52,6 98,1 47,7 24,6 22,3     
2005 815 1,3 99,8 100,0 56,8 39,8 98,9 37,8 14,7 14,8     
2006 1002 2,0 99,2 99,8 64,5 43,1 99,0 37,7 11,7 10,9     
2007 668 0,2 65,6 100 99,9 99,9 100 51,5 4,2 9,6     
2008 722 0,1 49,7 100 100 99,8 100 48,9 4,2 9,0     
2009 924 0,1 50,3 100 100 100 99,9 49,6 4,5 8,5     
2010 1099 0,9 57,6 99,7 99,8 99,5 99,9 54,8 8,2 7,6     
2011 448 0 100 62,1 100 100 100 99,8 99,8 2,0 9,8    
2012 629 0 100 60,3 100 100 100 100 100 9,2 8,3    
Notes: Vot: number of plenary votes; Gov: Share (%) of votes, in which the government coalition did not 
vote complete unison; 1994b and 2002b: changes in government composition; party abbreviations not 
in text: VR and VAR are small defected factions from VAS, The Finnish Rural Party SMP is the 
predecessor of PS; PPGs in governments are bolded and underlined. 
Source: Pajala and Jakulin (2012) and own computations. 
Turning further into the opposition results in Table 2 provide us with an 
understanding how united the opposition PPGs are in plenary votes. The most 
important finding is the large variance in how many groups (group majorities) voted 
against the government. The range is from all opposition parties down to no 
opposition parties. In the latter case, the votes were the result of proposals by only 
one MP or a minority of MPs from one or more opposition groups. Votes like these 
appeared especially during the Lipponen government (1999-2002) after which they 
seem to have disappeared almost completely. Why this is the case remains an 
open question. During the Aho (1991-1994) and Lipponen II governments the most 
frequent case was the whole opposition voting against the government. The 
number of opposition groups is at a minimum during the Lipponen II (KESK, KD) 
and Katainen (KESK, PS, VR) governments yet only in roughly half of the votes the 
opposition has been united. Preceding the Katainen administration (2011-2012) 
KESK lost the elections while PS was the winner. Both parties ended up in the 
opposition. Apparently KESK lost votes especially to PS which would explain the 
reluctance of KESK to cooperate with PS. Perhaps the same applies to the era of 
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the Lipponen II government as to some extent the KD and KESK appeal to the 
same voters. For other times the opposition seems to be rather evenly scattered. 
Since 2005 cases where one opposition group would not have been backed up by 
at least one other opposition group are rather seldom. Why the opposition is so 
scattered is probably due to the fact that votes are created as a result of proposals 
from opposition groups. One opposition group might be interested in some topic 
and sees it important or potentially advantageous to register their opinion to the 
plenary minutes while other opposition groups might show no interest to the matter 
at hand. After all, opposition in Eduskunta is not systematically coordinated. 
Table 2. Shares (%) of how many opposition groups voted against the government 
during 1991-2012 
Year 0 1 2 3 4 5  (%) 
1991 0,6 21,7 21,7 27,9 28,0  100 
1992 2,5 10,2 14,3 24,9 48,1  100 
1993 2,2 9,7 14,8 20,3 53,0  100 
1994a 1,7 14,0 11,7 27,4 45,3  100 
1994b 2,5 8,2 21,0 25,8 23,3 19,2 100 
1995 1,5 12,8 18,7 33,3 33,7  100 
1996 4,4 18,7 21,9 35,6 19,4  100 
1997 7,2 18,6 19,4 35,8 19,0  100 
1998 9,9 19,4 23,9 35,8 11,0  100 
1999 26,1 24,9 49,0    100 
2000 18,2 18,6 63,2    100 
2001 23,6 20,3 56,1    100 
2002 22,2 23,7 28,5 25,6   100 
2003 0,4 18,1 21,0 24,2 21,2 15,1 100 
2004 1,1 16,3 24,3 24,2 20,9 13,1 100 
2005 0,0 6,6 22,7 22,3 24,7 23,7 100 
2006 0,6 5,9 23,9 22,5 24,9 22,4 100 
2007 0 6,7 40,4 29,8 23,1  100 
2008 0 4,4 34,1 30,3 31,2  100 
2009 0 5,5 34,8 26,7 32,9  100 
2010 0,2 6,9 40,3 26,1 26,5  100 
2011 0 7,6 58,7 33,7   100 
2012 0,1 8,7 59,8 31,3   100 
Notes: For example in 1991 four opposition groups voted against the government 
in 28 percent of the votes; 1994a: KD in government; 1994b: KD not in 
government. Source: Pajala and Jakulin (2012) and own computations. 
Government-Opposition voting per electoral term 
So far we know the opposition groups are voting against the government with 
varying intensities. There are no extreme opposition groups which would always 
vote with or against the government. This is hardly surprising as there are no anti-
establishment parties in Eduskunta; moreover, minority governments (with their 
possible support parties) have not existed for decades. In what follows the analysis 
focuses on electoral terms instead of single parliamentary years in order to provide 
a more general picture on the cooperation among the PPGs. Government majority, 
as previously, is assumed to be an ‘actor’ among the party groups. For the 
analyses, I shall use a variation of a measure of group cooperation (or group 
distance) defined by Markku Laakso (1972a; 1972b). This measure has a very 
intuitive vector presentation. Basically, Laakso’s measure is a more sophisticated 
version of the previous cooperation measure of Rice (1928). The measures are, 
however, not comparable and Rice’s measure does not have a vector 
interpretation (Laakso 1972a, 9). From previous Finnish literature only Laakso’s 
results can and will be compared with the ones presented below. 
The Rice (1928) and Laakso (1972a) measures are basically just simple measures 
of distance between two voters over some set of votes. First we assume the voting 
choice of a PPG being the choice favoured by the majority of the PPG. The 
majority assumption is in our view rather justified as the voting minorities of the 
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PPGs, if any, are typically marginal (Pajala 2010). Next we assume the voting 
choice of the government being the one supported by the majority of government 
groups’ MPs. There are four possibilities how two groups Ai and Aj can vote: Both 
can vote “yes” (YY) or “no” (NN) or the groups can disagree (YN or NY). So, the 
more there are YY and NN cases thus lowering the number of YN and NY cases 
the closer the groups are. The difference between the voters’ cooperation and 
disagreement is then divided by the number of votes V. Formally, Laakso’s 
distance C in a vote can be obtained as 
   
V
NYYNNNYYC
ji AA
 , 
where index 
ji AA
C can have values in the range of [-1, 1]. Value 1 denotes 
complete agreement and -1 complete disagreement between two voters over the 
votes. At zero the voters (dis)agree on half of the votes. The computation over the 
votes will result in a distance matrix. The closeness or cooperation between two 
groups can now be illustrated geometrically by representing the groups as unit 
vectors and computing the angle between the vectors by using the values of 
ji AA
C . If we consider the PPGs as vectors in a space, their relation to the 
government majority can be visualised in the upper half of a unit circle (the length 
of the vectors is irrelevant). The government vector is fixed to the rightmost position 
i.e. the positive x-axis. Starting from origin the end point of the government vector 
is thus at (1, 0). A PPG vector always disagreeing with the government and having 
an index value of -1 would be mirroring the government in the negative x-axis 
ending at (1-, 0). A voter having an index value of 0 would be (dis)agreeing with the 
government in exactly half of the votes having a vector equal to the positive y-axis 
ending at (0, 1). The index value is simply the angle between the unit vectors. In 
Laakso’s original visualisation, the index value is the projection of a voter’s vector 
to the x-axis. Now, it is of course a matter of taste which version is applied. We like 
to apply the simpler visualisation and highlight the closeness of the government 
parties by using the angle as the index value. The projection version diagrams 
would instead boost the differences with respect to the government parties due to 
the underlying non-linear trigonometry. For details on Laakso’s original method see 
Pajala (2011). As an example consider groups KOK and The Agrarian Union (ML) 
in Figure 1 having 
ji AA
C index value 0.83. Converted to degrees we have 90*0.83 
= 75 degrees (to the right of y-axis). Likewise KOK and SDP have 
ji AA
C = -0.36 in 
Figure 1. Converted to degrees we get 90*-0.36 = -32 degrees (to the left of the 
zero point i.e. the y-axis). 
Instead of having the government majority as the rightmost voter Laakso (1972a; 
1972b) put KOK as the rightmost vector. The choice was quite understandable as 
at the 1960s KOK was considered the right-wing extreme in the technical sense 
that there was nothing to the right of KOK. Thus, all other groups could be 
measured against KOK. This resulted in a sort of pre-defined left-right dimension. 
In order to shed light to the second parliamentary era of Finland we turn to the 
three governments analysed in Laakso (1972a). The oldest of these was Lehto’s 
caretaker cabinet followed by Virolainen’s (KOK, ML, SFP, KP) right-wing coalition 
and finally the subsequent Paasio government (SDP, SKDL, KESK) which was a 
centre-left-wing coalition. Figure 1 shows the political landscape during the 
Virolainen government 1964-1966. The basic party setting and left-right dimension 
is almost identical regarding all three previous governments as it is in Figure 1. 
Although Lehto’s preceding caretaker cabinet was not responsible politically, 
practically the only difference with regard to Figure 1 was ML and VM being close 
together roughly where ML is in Figure 1. During the Paasio government, the left-
wing coalition partners (SDP, SKDL) together with TPSL were close together 
roughly where TPSL is in Figure 1. Also KESK was close to the left-wing coalition 
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partners being only a hair to the right. The right-wing parties considerably resemble 
the respective setting in Figure 1. The movement of ML from one side of the y-axis 
to the other was the largest PPG movement during these three governments of the 
second parliamentary era. All in all the division into socialist and non-socialist 
parties was very clear as Figure 1 shows. 
Figure 1. Government and opposition voting during the Virolainen government 
(1964–1966) 
 
Notes: Party abbreviations not in text: TPSL = Social Democratic League, VM = Liberal League, KP = 
Liberal People’s Party. 
Source: Nyholm (1972a) and own computations. 
Moving to the third parliamentary era Figures 2a-2f shows the political landscapes 
of the Aho (1991-1994), Lipponen I (1995-1998), Lipponen II (1999-2002), 
Vanhanen I (2003-2006) and Vanhanen II / Kiviniemi (2007-2010) governments 
and the first two years of the Katainen (2011-2012) governments. The government 
majority (GOV) is always located as the rightmost vector. Compared with Laakso’s 
(1972a, 1972b) result the most obvious difference is the closeness among the 
government groups: with respect to every government in the third era the coalition 
partners virtually show a unitary voting behaviour regardless of the composition of 
the government. The only old cabinet which resembles the modern ones is at some 
extent Paasio’s centre-left coalition. Nowadays the vectors of the coalition partners 
are hardly distinguishable and opposition groups are very clearly apart from the 
cabinets. Compared with the previous decades another important difference is that 
the left-right dimension cannot be seen any more. The government is a separate 
tight cluster and the opposition parties differ from the cabinet in a more or less 
random order. In Figures 2a-2f, the y-axis (not drawn in the Figures) for which the 
cooperation measure is zero can be interpreted as a divider: groups to the right of 
the positive y-axis are more likely to vote with the government than against it and 
on the left side of the y-axis the groups are more likely to oppose the government 
than to vote with it. The PPGs seem to form three clusters: one is the cabinet on 
the right. Second is the moderate opposition. A good example is KD, VIHR and 
KOK in Figure 2d, or KD and SDP in Figure 2e. It appears every government has 
at least one opposition party which is more likely to vote with it than against it. 
Examples are KOK in Figure 2d and KESK in Figure 2f. The third cluster are the 
less moderate or hard opposition. Examples are PS and VAS in Figures 2d-2e. 
The hardest opposition is also the most recent as is shown in Figure 2f (VR and 
PS). In fact, the opposition has become harder over time in Figures 2d-2f. Only if 
we set the resigned KD (resignation took place almost at the end of the 1991-1994 
electoral period) aside in Figure 2a the political landscape during the Aho 
government is perhaps the most polarised when compared with the other times. 
The Christian Democrats resigned from the cabinet in 1994 and the Greens of 
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VIHR in 2002. The effects can be seen in Figures 2a and 2c. After the resignations 
both parties deviate significantly from the cabinet, but only became moderate 
opposition parties. During every government, the opposition is rather scattered 
lending support to the observation that the opposition is not systematically 
organised. 
Figure 2a. Government and opposition voting during the Aho government (1991-
1994) 
 
Figure 2b. Government and opposition voting during the Lipponen I government 
(1995-1998) 
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Figure 2c. Government and opposition voting during the Lipponen II government 
(1999–2002) 
 
Figure 2d. Government and opposition voting during the Vanhanen I government 
(2003-2006) 
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Figure 2e. Government and opposition voting during the Vanhanen II and Kiviniemi 
governments (2007-2010) 
 
Figure 2f. Government and opposition voting during the first two years of the 
Katainen government (2011-2012) 
 
Discussion 
To recap, the purpose of the paper was to measure cooperation among PPGs in 
plenary votes. More precisely, the idea was to measure cooperation between 
government and opposition groups using information obtained from the comparison 
of group majorities to government majorities over parliamentary votes during 1991-
2012. By comparing these results with previous literature the aim was to map out 
the patterns of PPG cooperation in Finland since World War II. 
Two main results could be found in the previous literature published in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. First, plenary votes divided the government groups and the 
opposition groups into two separate and distinctive camps. Second, the votes also 
showed the PPGs following the traditional left-right dimension. During the 1950s 
nearly half of the plenary votes were of type that pitted Communists (SKDL) 
against others (Nyholm 1961, 134). The previous studies provide us with a rough 
picture on parliamentary dynamics until the mid-1980s. Using the terminology of 
Nousiainen (2000; 2006) the previous literature is about the second parliamentary 
era of Finland. In comparison the above results provide us with a picture on the 
subsequent third era of majority parliamentarism. The most important result has 
continued to be the clear division into government and opposition groups as in 
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previous times. Moreover it is now the case that government groups are a bloc 
voting virtually always in a unitary manner. The difference with the second era 
governments is clearly observable. Also, during the second parliamentary era the 
polarisation of the groups was rather high. The opposition groups were very far 
from the governing coalition. It seems there was less polarisation at the beginning 
of the third era, though since 2007 the polarisation seems to have been on the rise. 
A second important result was the absence of the left-right dimension with respect 
to the PPGs. This result is not entirely unexpected as for example the Lipponen I 
and II ‘rainbow’ coalitions practically included the whole dimension while KESK 
was in opposition. The same of course applies to Katainen’s ‘six pack’ coalition in 
office at the time of writing. 
Looking at the plenary votes it seems that ideological differences or variety among 
the political parties and hence also the PPGs have almost entirely disappeared. 
The former ‘ideological’ opposition has been replaced with its modern version 
which consists of PPGs that were left out of the coalition in the government 
negotiations. Exacerbating the situation we could perhaps talk about a more or less 
‘technical’ opposition. This, however, applies also to the governments as ideology 
was a strong factor in government formulation after World War II and almost up to 
the 1990s. In those days, the lifespan of a government was considerably shorter in 
comparison with the modern ones lasting for the whole four-year electoral period. 
During the second parliamentary era, the parties were rather inflexible ideologically 
and politically causing frequent government crisis. Since the 1990s basically any 
party combination including two out of the three (or four) largest parties has proven 
to be able to work. Ideological issues have not been the main obstacles. The best 
examples of this are the oversized coalitions of Lipponen and Katainen. 
The rank order prediction of opposition PPGs was rather successful. The largest 
PPGs (KESK, KOK, SDP), while in opposition, were found in the modest 
opposition and sometimes voted more likely with the government than against it. 
An exception to this was PS in the current electoral period. After the 2011 elections 
the party became the third largest PPG, however, adopted a completely different 
voting pattern being almost in extreme opposition. This is a new feature in Finnish 
politics. As a small party, PS was predicted to be in the hardest opposition together 
with VAS, which appeared to be the case. Finally, other small parties were found to 
be farther away from the government as the above three large ones, as expected. 
Against the somewhat intuitive prediction, the opposition parties moved closer to 
governments during the last year of an electoral period. Details of this rather 
interesting observation are left for further research. 
What was not visible any more in the latest parliamentary era was the left-right 
dimension which was still so obvious in the preceding times. It is of course the 
case that above I have specifically analysed the government-opposition dimension. 
However, according to the scaling results in Pajala (2012) this dimension has the 
most explanatory power with respect to plenary voting. Higher dimensions were 
hardly interpretable and at the best showed only weak traces of a possible left-right 
dimension. It is of course possible to order the parties from left to right and several 
data sources provide estimations for such positions. Still, the difficulty is that only 
VAS is unanimously seen as the leftmost party, but for the rest there is no 
consensus. A further thing is that government coalitions are not comprised of 
ideologically adjacent parties in the left-right sense. This is probably the main 
reason why the left-right dimension is nowadays virtually non-existent regarding 
plenary voting. As a concluding statement, this study has shown that (with the 
possible exception of the most recent electoral term) Eduskunta is not at all the 
divided and extremely polarised public arena that one might suspect by following 
the arguments in plenary popularised by the mass media. 
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economic choice between compulsory and 
voluntary incentivised motherhood? 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to explain why, in 1966, the Romanian leadership 
adopted a wholly restrictive pronatalist policy, based on the strict limitation of 
abortion, instead of one based on socioeconomic incentives to families, as 
suggested by technocrats. Previous literature shows disagreement on whether the 
choice was motivated by moralistic or economic considerations. In order to find an 
answer to this question, hundreds of pages of archival material unpublished so far 
have been analysed, including the minutes of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, statistics, documents identified in the Ministry of Health Archive, 
and the technical reports that were on the table at the time of the decision. The 
conclusion of this study, drawn on the basis of these documents, indicates that at 
the time of 1966, regardless of the suggestions of the technocrats, a decision had 
already been taken by Ceausescu himself. This decision was influenced directly by 
economic considerations, namely the wish to obtain the maximum pronatalist effect 
at a minimum budgetary cost. 
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